The 2009 elections: some numbers

The Lebanese look forward to parliamentary elections in June of this year. The 128 seats in the Majlis Al-Nuwab, or parliament, will all be up for re-election. The elections will take place under a law agreed to last May in Doha, Qatar, when the Lebanese parties resolved a long-running dispute on a whole bunch of issues, including a new electoral law.

The law includes a number of reforms never before seen in Lebanese elections, including setting up an independent electoral commission and elections in one day. Still, possibly the most important aspect of the law is the districting which is based on the “1960 law” which relies on the smaller “qada” districts as compared to the larger districts used in the 2005 elections.

As Lebanese society and politics is very sectarian, the sectarian demographics of elections is a very important factor in elections, if not the only. A look at the numbers reveals that there is a large difference between the electoral law in place in 2005 and that in place today in regards to the balance of the various sects. What is important in this regard is not the formal allocation of seats to various sects, but which sects dominate in each district. In other words, a Maronite seat in Jezzine does not count toward the Maronite balance if it is elected by a district dominated by Shia electors but rather counts towards the Shia balance.

According to data published in Al-Nahar and elnashra.com, I have been able to compare the sectarian balance of the 2005 and 2009 districting schemes. Here are some results:

The losers:

1. Under the 2005 law, the Sunni sect could dominate 53 seats; in 2009 it can dominate only 36.
2. The Shia sect’s guaranteed seats drop from 33 to 28.

The winners:

1. The number of seats the Maronite sect can dominate doubles from 16 to 32.
2. The Druze see a rise from 8 to 13.
3. The Greek Orthodox gain 3 seats from nothing in 2005.
4. Other Christian groups see a rise from 7 to 12.

The number of contested seats drops from 11 to 4. These seats are only contested in the sense that they are in districts not dominated by a single sect.

Please keep in mind that there are other factors that are likely to come into play than simply sect, though it remains an important factor in many districts. Particularly, factors include political alliances and people’s political affiliations at election time. The latter is expected to be the chief unknown factor particularly among Christians.

If we take into account some of the expected political alliances that are likely to hold during the elections, we can predict that March 14 can be relatively certain of winning 56 seats, while the opposition’s Hezbollah and Amal can clinch 41 seats. The remaining 31 seats will likely be contested in largely Christian areas between Aoun (opposition) on one side and various March 14 or independent lists on the other.

If Aoun wins the 31 seats, the opposition will end up with 72 seats and the current majority will have 56 seats. If Aoun loses, the opposition will have only 41 seats, with the rest having an absolute (2/3) majority of 87 seats. I suspect that neither of these two extremes will come to pass. Rather, it will be somewhere in between.

I confess that I am not extremely knowledgeable of district specific politics. In this regard, for example, I have placed Matn under the 31 contested seats as I am not sure what Murr’s chances really are versus Aoun. Someone with more on the ground knowledge might have the ability to say more. Still, I think it is quite safe to assume this is a district which is up in the air, so to speak.

For more background on elections in Lebanon, check out a previous post.